OFFICE OF THE

INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR



2025-2026

ANNUAL REPORT

Prepared by the Office of the Independent Police Monitor

March 15, 2026

Interim Independent Police Monitor **Aeiramique Glass**

Prepared for the City of Madison

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OFFICE OF THE

INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR

CITY OF MADISON, WISCONSIN

From the Desk of the Interim Independent Police Monitor

Aeiramique Glass

2025–2026 Annual Report

This report is the product of a year of work, cases reviewed, communities listened to, data examined, relationships built, and a commitment made to the people of Madison that this Office will operate equitably, effectively, and efficiently from this point forward.

I want to be direct with you about what you are reading. This is not a ceremonial document. It is a working record. It documents what this Office did, what the data shows, and what this City still needs to decide. I believe the community deserves that clarity, and I believe the decision-makers reading this report deserve it too.

This Office

Independent civilian police oversight exists because history has shown, clearly and repeatedly, that police departments cannot be the primary investigators of their own conduct. Internal Affairs units operate within the same institution, the same culture, and often the same professional relationships as the officers they are reviewing. That structure does not produce independence, and without independence, accountability is limited to what the institution is willing to see about itself.The Office of the Independent Police Monitor is Madison's answer to that problem. The OIPM is an official, independent agency of the City of Madison — operating outside of the police department, outside of policing culture, and free from the pressures of police officers' associations, law enforcement unions, and the political influences that have historically shaped whether accountability is applied or avoided. This Office answers to the community. What this Office does: receives and independently investigates complaints against MPD officers; reviews MPD's own internal investigations and issues independent findings; analyzes policing data to identify systemic patterns; makes formal recommendations to the Chief of Police, Mayor, and Common Council; and ensures that the most vulnerable members of this community, those most at risk of harm, least able to navigate institutional processes, and most in need of equitable policing, have an independent civilian channel through which their concerns, complaints, and experiences are heard and addressed. The PCOB and the broader public deserve to know that what happens to people in encounters with police gets examined by someone who is not police.

That work matters most when it is done well and done consistently. One of the first things I did when I arrived was address the backlog, 18 cases waiting when I came on board. Since then, this Office has been receiving one to two new cases per month for a total of 25 overall cases, with 8 cases closed and 3 open Independent investigations, and the remainder in the queue for IMP review and pathway. That progress has been made with 1.5 staff working on cases, no case management system, and a commitment that every single case is treated with care — reviewed thoroughly, investigated properly, and not pushed through just to clear a number. We are making real progress. I review every case personally. I met individually with the majority of the Police Civilian Oversight Board members, whose work and community commitments are deeply tied to public health and safety, to how people are treated, and to the conduct of the officers serving their communities. I visited every district and the Training Center, met each captain, and sat with some officers. I wanted to see the department this Office is charged with overseeing, not from a report, but directly.

What I found is a department with real strengths and real challenges. Officers who are doing hard work in complex circumstances, and a system that is not yet giving them — or the community, everything it needs to succeed. That is what this report is about.

What Madison Got Right

I want to say this plainly, because it matters: Madison made a strong decision with its chief selection. Chief John Patterson brings credibility, experience, and a professional standard this department needs. His willingness to engage directly with this Office from the first day — and to maintain that engagement consistently through monthly check-ins — reflects the kind of leadership that makes accountability work possible. I do not take that for granted, and neither should this City.

Madison also got something right with this Office. The structure of independent oversight — the OIPM and the Police Civilian Oversight Board — represents a genuine commitment to accountability. The architecture is sound. The question is whether the City will resource it, protect it, and act on what it produces.

> Independent oversight only works when it is adequately funded, structurally protected, and when its findings are met with a genuine commitment to act.
>
> That is what this report is asking for.

What You Will Find in This Report

This report contains data that is difficult to sit with. The racial disparities documented here, in Disorderly Conduct citations, in traffic stop outcomes, in juvenile arrest patterns, are not new to Madison. What may be new is seeing them this clearly, in one place, with the statistical evidence laid out. That is by design. This Office's job is to name what the data shows.

This report also contains cases, four of them, publicly summarized for the first time in this Office's history. They are anonymized but they are real. They describe what happened, what this Office found, and what we are asking MPD to do differently. They are the beginning of a permanent practice of transparency.

And this report contains recommendations, specific, prioritized, and directed to the people who have the authority to act on them. Some require immediate decision. Others are part of the FY2027 budget process. All of them are grounded in evidence.

A Word to the Community

You deserve a police department that serves everyone equitably and an oversight office that holds it accountable when it falls short. This report is part of fulfilling that obligation.

This work belongs to you. The data in these pages was gathered on your behalf. The cases were reviewed on your behalf. The recommendations were written with your safety, your dignity, and your trust in mind. I hope you will read this report, share it, and hold your elected officials accountable for responding to what it contains.

Aeiramique Glass

Interim Independent Police Monitor

Office of the Independent Police Monitor | City of Madison, Wisconsin

March 2026

About the Office of the Independent Police Monitor

The Office of the Independent Police Monitor is an independent City office established under Madison General Ordinance §5.19. It is the only office of its kind in Wisconsin — and one of relatively few in the country operating with a mandate this comprehensive. While the rest of Wisconsin relies on internal affairs divisions and the Police and Fire Commission for accountability, Madison built something different: a fully independent civilian oversight structure with the authority, mandate, and community governance to match.

That structure — if resourced and supported — is among the strongest in the nation. This report is, in part, a story about the gap between what Madison built and what Madison has been willing to invest in keeping it strong.

Mission, Vision & Values

MISSION

To provide independent, transparent, and community-centered oversight of the Madison Police Department — ensuring accountability, equity, and trust in public safety.

VISION

A Madison where every resident experiences policing that is fair, accountable, and grounded in dignity — and where the systems of oversight are strong enough to ensure it.

VALUES

Integrity. Independence. Equity. Transparency. Community trust. Accountability in both directions — for officers who fall short and for those who rise to the standard.

A Hybrid Model: Five Functions, One Office

The OIPM does not fit neatly into a single accountability category. It is a hybrid model — designed to carry five distinct functions simultaneously. Understanding what this Office actually does requires understanding all five.

Function	What It Means in Practice
Inspector General	Independent investigative authority — the OIPM opens, conducts, and closes its own investigations without MPD involvement or direction. Currently there are 3 open independent investigations.
Auditor	Systemic data analysis and pattern review — the OIPM conducts independent analysis of MPD data to identify

Function	What It Means in Practice
	patterns in policing outcomes, disparities, and compliance. This is ongoing work, not a one-time function.
Ombudsman	Complaint intake and community navigation — the OIPM receives complaints, guides complainants through the process, and ensures the community's voice is part of the record at every stage.
Monitor & Oversight Administrator	Independent review of MPD internal affairs — the OIPM reviews PSIA investigations, issues its own independent findings, and makes formal discipline recommendations to the Chief. The OIPM cannot implement discipline, but can appoint legal counsel to support a complainant before the Police and Fire Commission.
Advocate	Community voice in the accountability process — the OIPM represents the public interest at every stage. The community is the client. This Office exists because of and for the people of Madison.

> **Madison is the only city in Wisconsin with this model.**
>
> The rest of the state relies on internal affairs divisions — which report to the Chief — and the Police and Fire Commission — a statutory body appointed by the Mayor that hears appeals and aggrieved party complaints, but is not an independent police oversight body.
>
> Madison built something the rest of Wisconsin has not.
>
> The question is whether this City will resource it at the level its own mandate requires.

The Accountability Ecosystem

Madison police accountability structure is made up of interconnected bodies — each with a distinct role and distinct authority. The ecosystem works when each body functions as designed and the connections between them are clear.

How the Discipline Process Works: The Full Chain

Who acts at each step, what they do, and where OIPM sits in the process — from complaint filed to public record.


OIPM Complaint Processing Steps
Step
Who Acts
What Happens
OIPM's Role
1
Complaint Filed
Filed with OIPM or MPD/PSIA directly across any of four intake channels
OIPM receives, logs, and classifies
2
Classification
IPM personally: assigns severity level (1–5) and case pathway >>
Decision point – determines depth of OIPM involvement
3
Investigation
PSIA or OIPM, PSIA investigates (Pathways 2 & 3) and case pathway >>
OIPM monitors Pathways 2 & 3, leads Pathway 1
4
PSIA Report
PSIA → Chief & Asst. Chiefs: Completed investigation report >>
OIPM receives copy; conducts independent review
5
OIPM Review & Findings
IPM personally reviews PSIA investigation, may concur, disagree, or add findings. >> issues formal findings and discipline recommendations.
OIPM publishes findings; may take further action in support of complainant
6
Chief Decision
Chief of Police: reviews PSIA and OIPM findings. Makes final disciplinary determination.
OIPM publishes findings; may take further action in support of complainant
7
Mediation / RJ
OIPM facllitates –refers – never required, always complainant-centered
OIPM facilitates or refers - never required; always complainant-centered
9
PFC (if termination)
Termination matters go to PFC for hearing. Aggrieved parties may file under $62.13(5).
OIPM findings already on record; may participate

The Police Civilian Oversight Board

The Police Civilian Oversight Board is the community's governing body for police accountability in Madison. The OIPM is accountable to the Board as the representative of the community it serves. The OIPM operates with full independence in its investigative and oversight functions — the Board provides community-rooted governance, policy direction, and public accountability for this Office's work.

The Board is an active community institution — organizing, advocating, and holding both the police department and this Office accountable to the public interest. Board members bring direct community experience, including their own experiences with policing in Madison, to every aspect of their work.

Meeting Structure	Frequency	Standing Agenda Includes
Full Board	Quarterly	IPM Report-out, committee reports, board business, public comment
Executive Committee	Monthly	OIPM updates, operational decisions, agenda-setting
Standing Committee Meetings (2 committees)	Monthly	Committee work, community engagement, policy review, recommendations to full board

The Board has 13 seats, and currently has 11 members. Ten new members were onboarded during this reporting period with individual meetings conducted by the IPM. The PCOB is developing its own website and community calendar to support its public-facing organizing and advocacy work.

PCOB Budget

The PCOB has a dedicated budget line managed by the IPM. This line funds member stipends, childcare for meeting attendance, community engagement activities, and board training and conference participation.

In this reporting period, the OIPM Data Analyst and PCOB Chair attended the 2025 NACOLE Conference in Minnesota — the National Association for independent Civilian police oversight professionals.

PCOB Annual Chief Evaluation

The Police Civilian Oversight Board conducts a formal annual evaluation of the Chief of Police. This is a significant accountability function.

The evaluation is a Board function and operates independently of OIPM's complaint and case management work. It draws on the Board's direct community engagement, its review of departmental policy and outcomes, and its assessment of MPD's responsiveness to oversight findings and recommendations.

Office Staffing

The OIPM currently operates with three staff members carrying the full scope of a hybrid oversight office. The comprehensive responsibility documented below is the direct case for the staffing and budget requests in this report.

Aeiramique Glass Interim Independent Police Monitor	Agency head and chief executive of the OIPM, operating with statutory independence under M.G.O. §5.19. The IPM carries it all, investigates, audits, monitors, reviews, oversees, and manages every case that comes through this Office. Directs staff and consultants. Sets direction for how this Office moves forward. Manages all community, government, and institutional relationships. Serves as Executive Secretary to the Police Civilian Oversight Board. A public official, visible, accountable, and present in every district of this city. The one limitation: the IPM recommends discipline but cannot implement it. The IPM can also appoint legal counsel to support a complainant before the Police and Fire Commission.

Chioma Njoku Program Assistant II - Office Manager	Office Operations Manager and Board Liaison. Manages all office operations, purchasing, payroll, accounts, public records requests, scheduling, and vendor relationships. Serves as Liaison to the Police Civilian Oversight Board, supporting all board meetings and subcommittees, managing member onboarding, stipends, and childcare reimbursements. Handles all executive secretary functions for the IPM, correspondence, communications, board document preparation, PCOB press releases, and PCOB public-facing materials. OIPM First point of contact for the public, media, and government offices.
Greg Gelembiuk, Ph.D. Part-Time Data & Investigative Case Manager	Conducts all quantitative data and forensic analysis for the Office. Develops data acquisition plans, performs statistical analysis of policing patterns, and produces the data findings documented in this report. Supports PCOB recruitment; participates in community listening sessions. Currently serving in an expanded temporary role as Data & Investigative Case Manager during the staffing needs.

A note on staffing capacity

Three staff are carrying the operational load of a five-function hybrid oversight office.This is not sustainable at current funding levels.

The Needs Assessment section of this report documents what adequate staffing looks like and what the FY2027 budget request is designed to address.

Community Engagement & Office Activity

Community engagement is not an add-on to the work of the Office of the Independent Police Monitor, it is the work. This section documents the full scope of OIPM outreach and activity during the reporting period, from board governance and district visits to listening sessions, community partnerships, and programming now underway.

41	7	8	10
PCOB Meetings	Community Events	District & Training Visits	Board Members Onboarded

Police Civilian Oversight Board (PCOB) Governance

The PCOB provides accountability, policy guidance, and direct community voice in the oversight function. OIPM staff support all PCOB operations and attend all board meetings. The Board is active across four committees, each focused on a distinct area of the oversight mission.

Board Onboarding & Relationships

10 new PCOB board members were welcomed during the reporting period. The IPM met individually with the majority of board members to build direct relationships, understand their priorities, and ensure they had the support needed to engage fully in their oversight role.

Full board training was provided by Abha Thakkar, Mosaic Consulting Madison.

The PCOB Chair and OIPM Data Analyst attended the 2025 NACOLE Conference in Minnesota, connecting with peer oversight offices nationwide and bringing best practices back to the board.

Community Listening Sessions & Events

The OIPM held community listening sessions in multiple formats — in-person and virtual — to ensure accessibility across the city. Each session centered community voice, complaint process education, and direct dialogue between the Office and Madison residents. The IPM has also had meetings with community partners and stakeholders across the city to build the relationships that make this work possible.

Legislative Engagement — Common Council

Beginning the week of March 16, 2026, Interim IPM Glass will be meeting individually with Madison alders to build legislative relationships, brief electeds on the OIPM's work and needs, and open direct lines of communication between the Office and the

Common Council. These conversations are an important part of ensuring that elected officials understand the oversight function, the resource needs of the Office, and the community concerns the OIPM hears directly.

Relationship with MPD Leadership

The IPM met with Chief Patterson and all three Assistant Chiefs. These relationships have been foundational to the work of the Office since day one. The IPM holds monthly check-ins with Chief Patterson and maintains regular contact with Assistant Chief Angie Kamoske, connecting frequently on case-related matters.

MPD District Visits

Over the first months in the role — from December 2025 through early March 2026 — Interim IPM Glass visited all six MPD district stations and the Training Center, accompanied by Chief Patterson. The IPM met with each captain and command staff, learning the unique character, calls for service, physical environment, community relationships, and resource needs of each district. It was a pleasure to meet with all captains and their teams.

Most districts have community rooms, and the IPM sees these as natural venues for the district-level community conversations she hopes to facilitate with each captain — bringing officers and community members together in each district's own space, rooted in restorative practice.

What the IPM Observed

Leadership shapes everything. Command staff set the tone for how officers show up in the community and how officers are cared for — and that tone is visible from the moment you walk into a station.

Officer wellness and community safety are not separate concerns. Work environment directly affects mental health.A station that is welcoming to the community and supportive of its officers is an operational necessity.

Equity means giving each district what it needs. Some needs are shared: a mental health officer at every station,neighborhood resource officers in every community. Others are district-specific.

As MPD has made meaningful progress recruiting and hiring women officers, comfort rooms (nursing rooms) at each station are now an equity baseline, not an exception.

Housing Growth & Law Enforcement Roles

Much of Madison's affordable housing development is concentrated in the North District. The expectation — often unstated — is that law enforcement will be the primary support entity for residents of these housing complexes and shelters.

This expectation must be examined. A comprehensive conversation is needed about the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement in rapidly growing, high-need areas — and whether districts have the resources, training, and appropriate partners to meet those needs. The OIPM will be raising this formally with the City.

East District

East District — 809 S. Thompson Drive

Commanding Officer: Captain Edward Marshall

Patrol Officers: ~50 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Sensitive Crimes (8 detectives)

East District has the largest patrol staffing of any district. The station has a community medication disposal box and a welcoming environment. During the IPM's visit, she met with Patrol Lieutenant Kimberly Alan and Detective Lieutenant Tracie Jokala — both of whom were knowledgeable, engaged, and deeply committed to their district.

West District

West District — 1710 McKenna Blvd

Commanding Officer: Captain Dan Nale

Patrol Officers: ~35 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Sensitive Crimes (8 detectives)

West District shares a Community Policing Team with South and Midtown Districts. The IPM met with Captain Nale and command staff and toured the station.

South District

South District — 825 Hughes Place

Commanding Officer: Captain Harrison Zanders

Patrol Officers: ~30 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Special Victims (9 detectives)

South District is the most diverse district in the city and carries the highest volume of calls for service. The community relationships built here are among the strongest in the department. South District is set for a new build — a significant and welcome investment in the officers and community it serves.

North District

North District — 2033 Londonderry Drive

Commanding Officer: Captain Jamar Gary

Patrol Officers: ~40 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Person Crimes (8 detectives)

North District is experiencing significant growth in affordable housing development, bringing new service demands and important questions about the appropriate roles and resources for law enforcement in these communities.

Midtown District

Midtown District — 4020 Mineral Point Road

Commanding Officer: Captain Shannon Blackamore

Patrol Officers: ~40 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Property Crimes (9 detectives)

Midtown District shares a Community Policing Team with South and West Districts. The IPM met with Captain Blackamore and toured the station.

Central District

> **Central District**
>
> **Commanding Officer:** Captain Kipp Hartman
>
> **Patrol Officers:** ~40 patrol officers | **Investigative Unit:** Computer/Financial Crimes (5 detectives)
>
> *Central District operates in Madison's most complex environment: a capital city downtown where bars, the Capitol, the Dane County Jail, the courthouse, and the University of Wisconsin all intersect. The IPM Met with Captain Kipp Hartman*

MPD Training Center

The IPM toured the MPD Training Center and met with Captain Stephanie Drescher, who oversees the academy and training operations. The Training Center is home to the MPD recruit academy, the accelerated academy for lateral transfers, annual professional development for commissioned officers, and the Community Academy — and regularly welcomes outside agencies, community partners, and the public.

The IPM is partnering with Captain Drescher to develop a community cadet tour — bringing cadets out to community organizations and concluding with a restorative facilitation exercise. This model has been used successfully by the IPM in other states and cities, and brings restorative practice directly into law enforcement training from the earliest stages of an officer's career.

Upcoming Community Programming

The following programming is actively in development for the coming year, reflecting the OIPM's commitment to accessible, community-centered engagement and ensuring that the people most impacted by policing have a direct voice in accountability.

Program	Description	Status
Know Your Rights Clinics	Community education on legal rights during police encounters	In Development
Community Listening Sessions	Ongoing structured listening across Madison neighborhoods	Continuing
Learning Sessions	Topic-specific education on policing, accountability, and oversight	In Development

Program	Description	Status
Town Hall / Public Safety Forum	Citywide forum on public safety priorities and police accountability	Planned
Youth Advisory Committee	Youth-led advisory body bringing young people's voices into OIPM's work	Forming
District Community Conversations	Each captain hosts a restorative community dialogue in their station's community room	In Development
Cadet Community Tour + Restorative Facilitation	Cadets visit community organizations; restorative facilitation to close the day	In Development
Alder Meetings	One-on-one meetings with Madison Common Council members	Beginning March 16, 2026

Officer Wellness

Officer wellness is not a peripheral concern — it sits at the center of everything this Office cares about. The OIPM holds a direct relationship between how officers are supported and how they show up in the community. This is not a soft issue. It is a public safety issue.

The Work Environment Matters

Research on correctional officers has shown that a depressive, institutional work environment can cause secondary trauma in the people who work there — as though the officers themselves are confined alongside those they supervise. Policing carries a similar risk. Officers respond to crisis, violence, grief, and instability — day after day, shift after shift — often with insufficient support structures in place.

The physical station environment matters. A station that is welcoming, functional, and built to support the people who work there is not a perk — it is infrastructure. A station that feels like a holding cell communicates to officers that their wellbeing is not a priority. That message has consequences.

What the IPM Observed Across Districts

Equity in wellness resources means each district has what its officers need — not just what every district gets equally.

Every district should have: a mental health officer, neighborhood resource officers, and functional, welcoming space.

South District is receiving a new build — a welcome and necessary investment.

As MPD has made meaningful progress in recruiting and hiring women officers, comfort rooms (nursing rooms) at every station are now a baseline equity need. MPD has been doing this well and it should continue.

MPD works closely with CARES, which has done meaningful work in mental health response — but CARES is limited in scope. A deeper examination of law enforcement alternatives is needed, and districts must be resourced accordingly.

What the OIPM Is Watching

The OIPM will continue to pay attention to officer wellness as a dimension of accountability. How officers are trained, supported, and cared for directly affects the quality of the policing that Madison residents experience. The OIPM sees this not as an either/or — community safety or officer wellness — but as the same work, viewed from two sides of the same relationship.

The OIPM's Commitment on Officer Wellness

The Office will raise officer wellness concerns through the appropriate channels — including formal policy recommendations where the evidence supports it.

The OIPM supports MPD's efforts to recruit, retain, and care for a workforce that reflects Madison's diversity and is equipped to serve it well.

Complaint Process & Case Outcomes

This section describes how complaints come to the OIPM, who can bring them, how they are classified and resolved, and how this office's findings enter the formal accountability record. Every step involves direct IPM oversight. No case moves forward without it.

Who Can File a Complaint

There is no narrow definition of who can bring a matter to this Office. Anyone can file. Civilian oversight exists because policing affects everyone — and accountability should be accessible to everyone.

Who	Notes
Any community member	Whether or not you were directly involved. If you witnessed it, experienced it, or have information about it — you can file.
A family member or advocate	Filing on behalf of someone directly affected, including individuals who are unable to file for themselves.
Board members (PCOB)	Board members are encouraged to bring forward their own experiences and those of the communities they represent. The ordinance intentionally includes people with lived experience of policing — including prior law enforcement contact. This is by design.
Members of the public on behalf of their community	Community organizations, advocates, and residents who are aware of patterns or incidents affecting their community may bring those matters forward.
Police officers	An officer who witnesses misconduct by another officer may file a complaint with the OIPM. Accountability runs in all directions.
The OIPM — self-initiated	The OIPM does not wait for a complaint. If data, a pattern, a public incident, or community information warrants review, the IPM may open an independent investigation on the Office's own authority. This is an Inspector General function.

> You do not need a lawyer to file. You do not need certainty that misconduct occurred. You need only to tell this Office what happened. OIPM will determine the pathway from there.
>
> Complaints may involve any MPD officer, any MPD policy or practice, any pattern of conduct, or any incident in which MPD actions — or inactions — caused harm.

How to File a Complaint

Complaints may be filed through four channels. There is no wrong way to reach this Office.

Channel	How
Email	oim@cityofmadison.com
In Person	OIPM Office — City-County Building, 210 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd, Suite 501
Phone	608-261-7161
Mail or Drop-Off	Written complaint submitted to OIPM office address

Complaints may also be filed directly with MPD Professional Standards and Internal Affairs (PSIA). When filed with PSIA, OIPM is notified and monitors. When filed with OIPM, OIPM determines the appropriate pathway and level of involvement.

Severity Classification

Every complaint received by OIPM is reviewed and assigned a severity classification by the IPM personally. Classification drives urgency, pathway, and depth of OIPM involvement.

Level	Type	Examples	Response
Level 1	Critical	Excessive force, in-custody death, officer-involved shooting, sexual misconduct	Immediate IPM notification; OIPM Independent Investigation initiated

Level	Type	Examples	Response
Level 2	Serious	Unlawful arrest, serious injury, discriminatory conduct, retaliation	Priority review; OIPM Independent Investigation or Review of PSIA
Level 3	Significant	Procedural violations, unprofessional conduct, pattern concerns	Review of PSIA or Alternative Resolution; supervisory referral possible
Level 4	Administrative	Policy questions, service complaints, communication issues	Alternative Resolution; referral to MPD supervisor with OIPM follow-up
Level 5	Informational	Inquiries, commendations, general feedback	Logged; referred as appropriate; no investigation initiated

The Three Case Pathways

Once classified, the IPM assigns one of three case pathways. The pathway determines how deeply OIPM is involved in investigation and resolution.

PATHWAY 1

OIPM Independent Investigation

OIPM conducts its own investigation entirely independent of PSIA. The IPM leads. OIPM issues findings and formal discipline recommendations directly. Used for Level 1-2 complaints and any case where independent inquiry is warranted. Currently 3 open investigations under this pathway.

PATHWAY 2

Review of PSIA

PSIA conducts the investigation. OIPM monitors throughout, may request additional steps, and conducts an independent review of the completed PSIA investigation. OIPM issues its own findings — concurring, disagreeing, or adding OIPM's own findings.

PATHWAY 3

Alternative Resolution

Used where mediation, restorative justice, or an administrative resolution best serves the complainant and the accountability interest. Available at any stage in any pathway where both parties agree. Currently through the Legal Services budget line; formal program in FY2027.

Mediation and Restorative Justice

Not every complaint is best resolved through formal investigation. At appropriate points in any pathway, OIPM may offer mediation or restorative justice — where both the complainant and the officer agree to participate.

These are not lesser options. They can achieve outcomes formal investigation cannot — direct acknowledgment, repair, and understanding. This is currently available through the Legal Services budget line. A formal dedicated program is a FY2027 request.

Option	What It Is	When Available	Who Must Agree
Mediation	A facilitated conversation between complainant and officer guided by a neutral mediator	Any stage prior to formal findings	Both parties — voluntary only
Restorative Justice	A community-centered process focused on harm repair, accountability, and relationship	At intake as alternative or post-investigation as supplement	Both parties — voluntary only; may include community members

OIPM Findings and What They Mean

When OIPM completes its review, it issues formal findings — the official documented position of this Office, placed on the permanent public record regardless of what action the Chief takes.

Finding	What It Means
Concur	OIPM agrees with PSIA findings and outcome.
Concur with Additional Findings	OIPM agrees with PSIA outcome but identifies additional concerns not addressed in the PSIA investigation.
Disagree — Insufficient Action	OIPM finds PSIA recommended discipline insufficient. OIPM issues its own recommendation for greater or different discipline.
Disagree — Finding Not Supported	OIPM finds the evidence does not support PSIA conclusion. OIPM issues a contrary finding with supporting analysis.
Independent Finding	OIPM identifies issues not raised in the original complaint or PSIA investigation and documents them formally.

After issuing findings, OIPM may take further action in support of the complainant — follow-up on discipline implementation, monitoring for retaliation, referral to legal resources, or continued engagement through mediation or restorative justice.

Governance & the Accountability Ecosystem

The OIPM is the independent oversight body at the center of Madison's police accountability structure. The Police Civilian Oversight Board is the community's governing body — the OIPM is accountable to the Board as the representative of the community it serves. Each body in the ecosystem has a distinct authority, distinct limitations, and a distinct role. The table below shows what each body does and where its authority begins and ends..

Body	Authority	Function	Key Limitation
OIPM	MGO §5.19	Independent investigation; PSIA review; findings and discipline recommendations; data analysis; complainant advocacy; mediation and RJ	Cannot implement discipline — can recommend it and appoint legal counsel to support a complainant before the PFC; independent counsel arriving April 2026
PCOB	MGO §5.19	Community governance of OIPM; community engagement and systemic actions; organizing, advocacy, and activism; policy direction; formal annual Chief evaluation	Does not conduct investigations or direct individual cases
PSIA	MPD Internal	MPD internal affairs investigation; reports to Chief and Asst. Chiefs who hold disciplinary authority	Reports to Chief — not to OIPM or community
PFC	Wis. Stat. §62.13	Termination, discipline, and appeals hearings; §62.13(5) aggrieved party complaints	Not a complaint intake body; all civilian complaints 2023–present dismissed; no audit, investigation, or oversight function

A Note on the City Attorney and District Attorney

City Attorney — Issue & Impact

The City Attorney's office exists to protect the City and MPD — not the community. They represent MPD in civil cases, advise the department on legal exposure, and serve as counsel to the same institution this Office is charged with overseeing. The purposes of the City Attorney and the OIPM are inherently in opposition: one defends the institution; the other holds it accountable. This is why the OIPM requires its own independent legal counsel, fully separate from the City Attorney. As long as the OIPM relies on the City Attorney for legal guidance, its independence is structurally compromised.

District Attorney — Issue & Impact

The relationship between police and prosecutors is close by design — and that proximity has direct consequences for independent oversight. The District Attorney's office depends on MPD for cases, evidence, and cooperation. That dependency shapes charging decisions, and in some cases may insulate officers from accountability even where the OIPM has found misconduct. There is currently no MOU between MPD and the DA establishing standard post-arrest communication or charging notification protocols. This means the OIPM cannot systematically track what happens to a case after arrest, cannot monitor for charging disparities by race or district, and cannot ensure that community members understand the full outcome of their encounter with police. The DA operates in the same ecosystem as this Office — but without the accountability structures that make independent oversight possible. A formal MOU is needed.

What this ecosystem is missing

- A formal MPD-DA MOU on post-arrest communication and charging notification.
- MPD adoption of Body-Worn Cameras — OIPM already has authority to access footage once BWC is implemented.
- A case management system enabling timely resolution, PSIA investigation timelines, and Chief decision timelines.
- Adequate budget to staff the full scope of this Office's five-function mandate.

Case Outcomes This Reporting Period

During this reporting period, 25 complaints were filed with the OIPM. Eight cases have been closed. Three independent investigations are currently open. This is the first period in which this Office has publicly summarized its closed cases — a practice that is now permanent.

	Count	Notes
Complaints filed	25	Across all 6 MPD districts
Cases closed	8	First public case summaries in Office history
Open independent investigations	3	Active — details not published pending resolution
Cases in review / monitoring	Active	Ongoing PSIA coordination and OIPM monitoring

Four of the eight closed cases are summarized in the following section. Other than protected classification matters or circumstances requiring additional confidentiality protections. All other closed case summaries will be posted on the OIPM website.

Closed Case Summaries

The cases below represent the first examples of closed case summaries that will be published on the OIPM website. Going forward, all closed case summaries — except those that fall into a protected classification — will be made publicly available on the OIPM website as part of this Office's commitment to transparency and community trust.

> *Cases may be placed in a protected classification when the nature of the matter — such as incidents involving children or mental health calls for service — requires that privacy, dignity, and safety take precedence over public disclosure. In those circumstances, the case may be closed or resolved without a public summary. All other closed cases will be summarized and published on the OIPM website.*

In addition, OIPM will be implementing an officer commendations section on the OIPM website. This reflects OIPM's commitment to recognizing professional conduct that meets or exceeds standards — not only addressing conduct that falls short.

Case 1 | Unlawful Arrest, Unsafe Transport & BWC Compliance

OIPM Process:	Formal OIPM Review of PSIA Investigation
Officers Involved:	Two officers (Officer A and Officer B)
Status:	Closed — PSIA Findings Sustained / Additional OIPM Findings Issued

Allegation & Finding Breakdown

Allegation	Officer	PSIA Finding	OIPM Determination
Stop & Frisk SOP Violation (Unlawful Arrest)	Officer A	Sustained	Sustained — Concurs
Stop & Frisk SOP Violation (Unlawful Arrest)	Officer B	Sustained	Sustained — Concurs
Emergency Vehicle Operation / Unsafe Transport	Officer A	Sustained	Sustained — Concurs

Allegation	Officer	PSIA Finding	OIPM Determination
BWC Pilot Program SOP / Muting	Officer B	Exonerated	Exonerated — Concurs (concern noted)
Investigative Sequencing / Probable Cause	Both Officers	N/A	Additional OIPM Finding

What Happened

Police received a call from staff at a veterinary clinic raising concerns about a client. Two officers responded. As officers arrived, the complainant walked out of the business. Staff identified the complainant as the individual they had called about.

Officers followed the complainant. When the complainant did not provide identification, officers arrested the complainant for obstruction. An investigation was subsequently conducted. During that investigation, the sergeant advised the officers that the obstruction charge was not legally supported under those circumstances — failure to provide identification alone does not constitute obstruction.

A disorderly conduct charge was subsequently added. All charges were ultimately dropped. The reporting party denied the original allegations, and follow-up investigation disproved the other claims made in the initial call.

Body-worn camera footage — available because one of the two officers was wearing a camera — shows that when officers arrived, the complainant was quiet and non-threatening. This case originated from the backlog of complaints inherited by the current Interim Independent Police Monitor upon taking office. The elapsed time between the incident and OIPM's review is acknowledged.

OIPM Review & Findings

OIPM conducted a Formal OIPM Review of the PSIA Investigation, including body-worn camera footage, investigative reports, and follow-up materials. OIPM concurred with all sustained PSIA findings related to Stop and Frisk procedures and unsafe in-custody transport.

OIPM also concurred with the exoneration of Officer B regarding BWC activation, as the actions taken fell within the parameters of the pilot program SOP. However, OIPM noted that BWC muting occurred during internal officer discussions at a critical stage of the encounter. While technically compliant with the current SOP, this raises transparency concerns that OIPM communicated directly to MPD leadership.

Beyond the PSIA findings, OIPM identified significant additional concerns:

- Arrest occurred prior to any investigation into the original allegations.

- After obstruction was determined to be legally unsupported, a disorderly conduct charge was added — a sequence that raises concerns about probable cause and investigative sequencing.
- The record does not clearly establish whether a supervisor directed the addition of the disorderly conduct charge or whether officers independently elected to proceed. This ambiguity requires clarification.

OIPM Recommendations

- Clarification of supervisory reassessment obligations when probable cause for an initial charge becomes unsupported.
- Training reinforcing that releasing an individual when probable cause fails reflects professionalism — particularly for early-career officers.
- Enhanced BWC recording expectations during arrest-related deliberations.
- Consideration of restorative practices, given the significant harm caused to the complainant by this encounter.

Probable cause must exist at the moment of restraint — not based on information developed after arrest. When that foundation becomes unsupported, the obligation is to reassess and, where appropriate, release. This Office is committed to ensuring that obligation is clearly understood and consistently practiced.

Case 2 | Officer Conduct — State Street Incident

OIPM Process:	Formal OIPM Review of PSIA Investigation
Officers Involved:	One officer (Sergeant rank)
Status:	Closed — Code of Conduct Violation Sustained

Allegation & Finding Breakdown

Allegation	Officer	PSIA Finding	OIPM Determination
Code of Conduct — Courtesy, Respect & Professional Conduct	Sergeant A	Sustained	Sustained — Concurs

What Happened

A complaint was submitted based on a video recorded on State Street and circulated publicly online. In the video, a young adult approached an MPD sergeant and asked for a fist bump. The officer used explicit and verbally abusive language directed at the member of the public and made an intimidating gesture toward that individual.

PSIA investigated and sustained a violation of MPD's Code of Conduct governing Courtesy, Respect, and Professional Conduct. Discipline was issued through the MPD internal process.

OIPM Review & Findings

OIPM conducted a Formal OIPM Review of the PSIA Investigation, including the video evidence and related documentation. OIPM concurs with the sustained finding. The conduct observed — explicit verbal abuse and an intimidating gesture directed at a member of the public — did not meet the professional standards expected of MPD officers and negatively impacted community trust.

OIPM does not agree that the discipline issued fully reflects the seriousness and public impact of this conduct, particularly given that the incident was recorded and widely circulated. As discipline had already been issued prior to OIPM's review, OIPM is offering forward-looking recommendations.

OIPM Recommendations

- Reinforcement of professional conduct standards prohibiting verbally abusive or threatening language in all public interactions.
- Continued training in procedural justice and professional communication, including de-escalation in low-stakes encounters.
- Development of an officer wellness protocol to provide structured support when officers have responded to multiple high-stress calls within a defined period.
- Exploration of restorative accountability practices where appropriate.

> *The officer communicated experiencing a series of high-stress calls prior to this incident. That context does not excuse the conduct observed. It does, however, underscore the importance of proactive wellness support. Officers cannot be expected to absorb compounding stress without structured intervention — both for their well-being and for the safety of the public they serve.*

Case 3 | Civil Assist — Policy Concern

OIPM Process:	Independent OIPM Review
Officers Involved:	One officer
Status:	Closed — No Policy Violation Found / Formal Policy Review Initiated by OIPM

Allegation & Finding Breakdown

Allegation	Officer	PSIA Finding	OIPM Determination
Civil Assist — Verification & Documentation Practices	Officer A	N/A	No Violation — Policy Review Initiated

What Happened

A complainant reported that an agency located out of state contacted MPD and requested that an officer be sent to the complainant's residence to retrieve items. The complainant stated that the information provided to MPD by the requesting party was inaccurate or misrepresented. When an officer arrived at the residence, the complainant perceived the visit as intimidating.

The complainant did not allege a specific violation of MPD policy. The complaint requested that MPD implement a written requirement that any party requesting a civil assist must document their identity and the legal basis for the request before police are deployed.

Context: What a Civil Assist Is — and Is Not

MPD civil assist protocol is designed for officer standby situations — typically accompanying someone to retrieve personal belongings in a potentially tense but civil matter, where a neutral police presence helps keep the situation safe. It is not designed to serve as a mechanism for out-of-state agencies to direct MPD officers to a private residence to collect items on their behalf, nor to be initiated based on an unverified phone call from a third party whose identity and authority were not confirmed by MPD prior to deployment.

OIPM Review & Findings

OIPM conducted an Independent OIPM Review of this matter. No specific misconduct allegation was raised, and OIPM closed this complaint without a finding of policy violation.

However, the circumstances raised meaningful questions about how civil assist requests are initiated, verified, and implemented — and whether current policy provides adequate safeguards when requests originate from parties whose identity and authority cannot be readily confirmed. OIPM initiated a formal policy review of MPD's civil assist practices as a result of this complaint.

OIPM Policy Review — Areas of Focus

- Documentation standards for civil assist requests, including written documentation of the requesting party's identity and stated legal authority.
- Verification requirements before an officer is deployed — particularly when the request originates from outside Madison or from a party MPD cannot readily confirm.
- Clarification of what constitutes an appropriate civil assist request versus a request that falls outside the scope of MPD's civil standby function.
- Safeguards to prevent the use of civil assist as a mechanism for third-party property retrieval without proper legal basis.

Complaints that raise policy concerns — even when no individual misconduct is found — serve an important public function. This case is an example of how a community member's experience can surface a gap the system did not know it had. OIPM will follow up with MPD on the outcome of this policy review.

Case 4 | Complaint Regarding Investigative Adequacy

OIPM Process:	Independent OIPM Review
Officers Involved:	One detective
Status:	Closed — Unfounded

Allegation & Finding Breakdown

Allegation	Officer	PSIA Finding	OIPM Determination
Failure to Conduct Adequate Investigation	Detective A	N/A	Unfounded

What Happened

A complainant reported activity observed at a public location that was perceived as suspicious. MPD investigated and, through witness interviews and identity verification, confirmed that the individuals involved had a familial relationship. The complainant was dissatisfied with that conclusion and filed a complaint with OIPM, alleging that the investigating detective failed to conduct an adequate investigation.

This matter had a prior history within the Office, including a review session that was disrupted when the former Independent Police Monitor resigned on the day of a scheduled meeting with the complainant. As a result, the case remained unresolved for a significant period prior to the current Interim Independent Police Monitor's review.

OIPM Review & Findings

OIPM conducted an Independent OIPM Review of all available materials — not relying solely on prior work — including the original investigative report, relevant records, and concerns raised directly by the complainant to this Office.

The review did not substantiate the allegation. The evidence reflects that the detective conducted an adequate investigation and took reasonable steps to confirm the identities and relationships of the individuals involved. This complaint is closed as unfounded.

> *OIPM acknowledges that the elapsed time — including the disruption caused by the prior monitor's departure on the day a review session was scheduled — contributed to understandable frustration for the complainant. How long a complaint remains open matters, and this Office takes that seriously. OIPM has separately followed up with MPD leadership regarding investigative communication practices, with the goal of reducing confusion and improving clarity in future cases.*

Protected Classification Cases

A small number of cases closed during this reporting period involve matters that may fall into a protected classification. Examples of the types of cases that could fall into this category include complaints arising from incidents involving children or from mental health calls for service. When a case falls into this classification, it may be closed or resolved without a public summary, in order to protect the privacy, dignity, and safety of all individuals involved.

These cases were resolved through close collaboration with MPD leadership using a trauma-informed approach. Where additional support or services were needed, OIPM worked to ensure those resources were connected. OIPM's commitment to accountability does not end because a case cannot be publicly disclosed.

Complaint Patterns — OIPM & PSIA

This section presents data on complaints filed with OIPM and through PSIA — the MPD internal affairs unit — during the reporting period. Complaint pattern analysis covers January 1, 2025 to February 3, 2026 approximately 13-month analysis period) for PSIA, and November 1, 2024 to present (an approximately 16 month analysis period) for OIPM . Data is analyzed by district and by officer complaint history. All findings are presented as descriptive data; patterns warrant ongoing monitoring and do not by themselves establish misconduct.

What This Data Tells Us

54 officers appear in 2 or more complaint cases during the analysis period.

3 officers have 7 complaint cases each — the highest in the department.

18 officers have at least one case in which an allegation was sustained.

Repeat-complaint patterns do not automatically indicate misconduct — some officers work high-contact assignments. However, the concentration of complaints in a small number of officers warrants ongoing monitoring and proactive supervisory engagement.

The OIPM will continue to track repeat-complaint patterns as part of its oversight function.

3
Officers
7 complaints each

54
Officers with 2+
Complaint Cases

18
Officers with a Sustained
Allegation

OIPM Complaints by District

The OIPM and the Professional Standards and Internal Affairs (PSIA) unit each receive and track complaints against MPD officers. Examining complaint patterns by district — normalized for population — helps identify where community members are most likely to experience conduct that rises to the level of a formal complaint. 25 complaints were filed with OIPM during this reporting period. East District generated the highest raw volume. However, when normalized for district population size, South District shows the highest complaint rate per capita, followed by East, North, and Central.

District	Complaints Filed	District Population (est.)	Note
East	8	55,585	Highest raw volume
Central	6	51,195	
North	5	36,364	
South	4	21,131	Highest per capita rate

District	Complaints Filed	District Population (est.)	Note
Midtown	1	70,970	Lowest per capita rate
West	1	63,997	

Note: District population figures are census-based estimates. Boundary alignments may introduce slight variation. For a small number of complaints, district assignment involved an educated determination.

OIPM Complaints per Capita by District

The chart below shows OIPM complaint cases per capita per month for each district, with Poisson model-based 95% confidence intervals. East, Central, and North Districts show the highest complaint rates relative to their populations.



OIPM Complaint Cases per Capita by District | Rate per resident per month | Poisson-based 95% CI

> *Confidence intervals are wide due to small sample sizes. South District's high per capita rate reflects both complaint volume and its comparatively small resident population. These trends should be interpreted with caution and monitored over time.*

The OIPM and the Professional Standards and Internal Affairs (PSIA) unit each receive and track complaints against MPD officers. Examining complaint patterns by district — normalized for population — helps identify where community members are most likely to experience conduct that rises to the level of a formal complaint.

PSIA Complaint Data by District

PSIA — MPD's Professional Standards and Internal Affairs unit — receives and investigates formal complaints against officers. The data below reflects PSIA complaint cases and allegations by district, normalized for population. North and Central Districts carry the highest internal complaint rates per capita.



PSIA Complaint Cases per Capita per Month | 95% Confidence Interval | Analysis: OIPM Data Analyst

PSIA Complaint Cases per Capita by District

PSIA complaint data shows a similar pattern. North and Central Districts have the highest rates of formal internal complaints per capita, consistent with the OIPM complaint distribution. Confidence intervals are wide due to relatively small sample sizes — trends should be read directionally, not as precise estimates



PSIA Allegations per Capita per Month | 95% Confidence Interval | Analysis: OIPM Data Analyst

> *PSIA complaint patterns — North and Central Districts carrying the highest per capita rates — are consistent with OIPM complaint patterns. This alignment warrants ongoing supervisory attention. Context matters: some districts carry higher enforcement contact volumes, which may correlate with higher complaint rates independent of misconduct. The data is a starting point, not a conclusion.*

> *The concentration of complaints in a small number of officers is a pattern that requires active supervisory engagement — not as a presumption of misconduct, but as a commitment to proactive oversight. Officers with sustained allegations across multiple cases should receive priority attention in supervisory review cycles.*

Data Analysis of MPD Policing Practices: Examining Arrest, Citation, and Traffic Stop Data to Understand Policing Patterns in Madison

This section presents a data-driven analysis of arrest, citation, and traffic stop patterns within the Madison Police Department. The analysis was conducted by the OIPM Data Analyst using MPD administrative data.

The chart below shows MPD arrests by police district and race, providing a baseline view of how enforcement activity is distributed across the city. The charts throughout this section present quantitative findings alongside narrative context and formal OIPM observations. Where interpretation or policy implications are discussed, those conclusions are clearly identified as OIPM observations.

Arrest Rates by District

Per capita arrest rates vary significantly by district, with patterns that correlate with the demographic composition of each district's service area. These district-level patterns reinforce the broader finding that enforcement outcomes in Madison are not racially neutral.



Disorderly Conduct Enforcement Audit: Examining the Use of Disorderly Conduct Charges in Madison Police Department Enforcement Activity.

Disorderly Conduct (DC) is one of the most discretionary charges in MPD's toolkit. It can be filed as a criminal charge under State Statute 947.01(1) or as a civil citation under City Ordinance 24.02(1). Because DC is highly discretionary, it is particularly sensitive to

the influence of implicit bias — and a useful lens for examining whether race affects how officers exercise that discretion.

The OIPM Data Analyst conducted a detailed analysis of DC arrests and citations using MPD data from January 2023 through August 2024 and from January 2025 through February 2026.

11×	50×	6.9:1
Madison DC Rate vs. National Average	Madison DC Rate vs. Milwaukee	Black-to-White Juvenile DC Citation Ratio

DC Charges Are Rising

Across all three measures, the proportion of arrests involving Disorderly Conduct has increased in the 2025–2026 period compared to 2023–2024. The increase in sole-DC arrests — from 7.96% to 9.02% — is of particular concern for racial equity, as sole-DC arrests are the most discretionary and carry the sharpest racial disparities.



Madison vs. Peer Cities: A Striking Gap

Madison's Disorderly Conduct arrest rate is dramatically higher than comparable cities. At 0.0110 arrests per capita for all DC arrests, Madison is approximately 11 times the national average and 50 times Milwaukee's current rate. Milwaukee has nearly

eliminated DC arrests through deliberate policy reform. This comparison is a direct challenge to any claim that Madison's DC rate is normal or inevitable.



Racial Disparities in DC Citations — Juveniles

The most significant finding in the DC audit concerns juvenile citations. When juveniles are charged with DC as their sole offense, Black juveniles receive the civil citation form (City Ordinance 24.02) at 6.9 times the rate of white juveniles. This disparity is statistically significant ($p = 0.011$). Adjusted for population, a Black juvenile in Madison is approximately 25 times more likely than a white juvenile to receive a sole DC citation.

This matters because the threshold for issuing that citation appears to be applied differently by race. Officers should not be citing juveniles for conduct that does not warrant enforcement at all. The data suggests Black juveniles are being ticketed at a lower threshold — stops and interactions that would not result in a citation for a white juvenile are producing one for a Black juvenile.

It also matters because of what citations make possible. A sole DC citation routes a juvenile toward restorative justice diversion. A criminal charge does not. When a juvenile has two minor citable offenses — DC and resisting — officers are issuing criminal charges rather than citations. That forecloses RJ eligibility entirely. The correct practice is to issue citations and refer the juvenile to restorative justice. The current practice substitutes a criminal record for a constructive intervention.


Disorderly Conduct: Criminal Charge vs. Citation by Race — Juveniles
2023–2024 Data, Sole DC Charge/Citation Only | Citation disparity is statistically significant (p = 0.011)
Black Juveniles
White Juveniles
Number of Juveniles
100
80
60
40
20
0
25
12
76
11
Ratio: 2.1:1
Ratio: 6.9:1
(p = 0.011)
Criminal Charge
(State Statute 947.01)
Citation
(City Ordinance 24.02)
Black juveniles receive DC citations at 6.9× the rate of white juveniles — statistically significant.
Per population, a Black juvenile is ~25× more likely than a white juvenile to receive a sole DC citation.
Citations block access to restorative justice. This disparity is a structural harm.
Source: Madison Police Department data, analysis by Office of the Independent Police Monitor, City of Madison

The OIPM's Finding on DC Citations

The 6.9:1 Black-to-white citation ratio for juveniles is not explained by behavior alone. It reflects a pattern in which discretionary enforcement choices — whether to cite or charge — are being made differently for Black and white children.

One plausible interpretation: Black juveniles are being cited at a lower threshold of behavior — penalized for conduct that would not trigger enforcement against white peers.

This is a structural harm. Citations block restorative justice access. They create records. They follow children. Madison must examine this pattern directly.

DC Charge Distribution by District (2025–2026)

The proportion of DC charges is relatively consistent across districts, suggesting that DC overuse is a department-wide pattern rather than a district-specific one.

District	% of All Charges/Citations That Are DC
South	20.55%
Central	19.81%
North	18.57%
Midtown	18.27%
East	18.23%
West	17.68%

OIPM Recommendations — Disorderly Conduct

1.The City and MPD should formally examine whether DC arrest and citation rates reflect equitable enforcement — with particular attention to the juvenile citation disparity.

2. MPD should review whether DC criminal charges are being used in circumstances where citations could instead be given — especially for juveniles who could thereby be referred to restorative justice.

3. The City should explore policy reform aligned with Milwaukee's approach, which has dramatically reduced DC arrests without compromising public safety.

4. MPD training should address the discretionary nature of DC enforcement and the associated racial disparities. Situational Decision-Making Training may be of particular value, as it has been shown to reduce discretionary arrests and racial disparities in enforcement outcomes.

5. OIPM will continue to monitor DC trends in each reporting cycle.

Traffic Stop Racial Disparity Analysis: Examining Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Data

This analysis examines racial disparities in MPD traffic stop data from 2021 through 2025. The analysis was conducted by the OIPM Data Analyst and constitutes, to the best of the analysts' knowledge, the first study to compare warning vs. citation rates for

individual single offense types — creating an apples-to-apples comparison that isolates officer discretion from driving behavior.

45%	1.4:1	10:1
More Likely: White Driver Gets Warning vs. Citation	Black to White Stops at 2–4 AM	White-to-Black Resident Ratio in Madison

Stop Disparities by Time of Day

Racial disparities in traffic stops are dramatically higher at night, especially between 11 PM and 4 AM. In the 2–4 AM window, 1.4 Black drivers are stopped for every 1 white driver — in a city where white residents outnumber Black residents approximately 10 to 1. At any hour, a stop ratio above 1.0 represents an extreme overrepresentation.

Black drivers are also stopped more frequently for nonmoving violations — such as expired registration or tinted windows — especially at night. Nonmoving violations are a common indicator of pretextual stops, where the stated reason for the stop may not be the actual reason.


Ratio of Black to White Drivers in MPD Traffic Stops — By Hour of Day
Navy bars = hours with highest disparity (ratio > 0.85) | 2021–2025 MPD Traffic Stop Data
1.0 — Equal stop rate
~0.10 — Expected if proportional to population
1.42 Black drivers stopped per white (2–4 AM)
Black : White Driver Stop Ratio
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
12 AM
1 AM
2 AM
3 AM
4 AM
5 AM
6 AM
7 AM
8 AM
9 AM
10 AM
11 AM
12 PM
1 PM
2 PM
3 PM
4 PM
5 PM
6 PM
7 PM
8 PM
9 PM
10 PM
11 PM
At 2–4 AM, 1.4 Black drivers are stopped for every 1 white driver — in a city where white residents outnumber Black residents 10 to 1.
Black drivers are also more likely to be stopped for nonmoving violations (e.g. expired registration), especially at night — a pattern consistent with pretextual stops.
tor, City of Madison

Warning vs. Citation: The Discretion Gap

After controlling for offense type — comparing stops for the same single non-speeding violation — white drivers are 45% more likely to receive a warning rather than a citation. This finding is statistically significant ($p = 8.78 \times 10^{-10}$, across 39 offense types). It cannot be explained by driving behavior, car value, or neighborhood. Race is the variable that tracks the outcome.

In addition, citations are more likely to be reduced in severity for white drivers. For speeding violations, white drivers receive a reduction in stated speed on the citation at least 34% more often than Black drivers. These patterns are consistent with racially biased enforcement of discretionary decisions.



The OIPM's Finding on Traffic Stop Disparities

The evidence in this analysis is not ambiguous. When officers stop drivers for the same offense and then choose whether to warn or cite — race predicts the outcome.

This is not a difference in driving behavior. It is a difference in how discretion is exercised.It is a difference that follows Black drivers across 39 offense types and across five years of data.

Madison has extremely well-documented racial disparities in policing outcomes — among the most extreme of any large city in the nation. This traffic stop analysis provides direct evidence that officer discretion is a contributor to those disparities. Moreover, the disparities track race and not socioeconomic status as proxied by car value. These findings demand a direct policy response.

Juvenile Arrest Disparity by Charge Type

Black-to-white juvenile arrest ratios vary by charge type, but disparity is present at every level of severity. Felony charges show the highest disparity at 5.22:1. Misdemeanors show 2.61:1. Even citations and summons — the lowest severity level — show a disparity of 1.57:1. There is no level of charge type that is free of racial disparity.


Black-to-White Juvenile Arrest Ratio by Charge Severity
Jan 2023 – Aug 2024 | A ratio of 1.0 means equal arrest rates
1.0 = Equal rates (no disparity)
Black-to-White Juvenile Arrest Ratio
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5.22:1
2.61:1
1.57:1
Felony Charges
Misdemeanor Charges
Citation / Summons
Black juveniles are arrested for felony charges at 5.22× the rate of white juveniles.
Disparity persists even at the lowest severity level (citations: 1.57:1). No level of charge type is free of racial disparity.
Source: MPD Data | Analysis: OIPM Data Analyst | Office of the Independent Police Monitor, City of Madison

No Level of Charge Is Free of Racial Disparity

- Felony charges: 5.22:1 Black to white juvenile arrest ratio
- Misdemeanor charges: 2.61:1
- Citations and Summons: 1.57:1
- The disparity decreases with charge severity — but it never disappears.
- This pattern is consistent with a system in which race influences outcomes
- at every stage and every level of enforcement contact.

Formal OIPM Recommendations — Racial Equity

Based on the data presented in this section, the OIPM issues the following formal recommendations to the City of Madison, the Common Council, and the Madison Police Department.

#	Recommendation	Directed To	Priority
1	Commission and publish a formal racial equity audit of MPD traffic stop outcomes, using the methodology developed by the OIPM Data Analyst as a baseline.	City / MPD	Immediate
2	Develop and implement multifaceted bias-breaking training, with specific attention to discretionary enforcement decisions. This could potentially include the use of “Learning Communities” such as those operated by the University of Wisconsin Leadership Institute.	MPD	Immediate
3	Formally examine the DC citation-vs-charge disparity for juveniles and adopt policy changes to ensure Black and white juveniles receive equal access to restorative justice diversion.	MPD / City	Immediate
4	Adopt DC enforcement reforms consistent with the Milwaukee model, with the goal of reducing Madison's DC arrest rate to align with peer city benchmarks.	City / Common Council	FY2027
5	Establish a public racial equity dashboard for MPD data — including traffic stops, DC arrests, and use of force — updated annually and reviewed by the PCOB.	City / MPD / OIPM	FY2027
6	Require that MPD supervisors document the basis for DC charges in cases involving sole DC arrests, to create an auditable record of discretionary enforcement decisions.	MPD	Immediate

A Note on Methodology

All quantitative analysis in this section was conducted by the OIPM Data Analyst using MPD data. Statistical significance is reported where applicable. Where confidence intervals are wide due to small sample sizes, findings are presented directionally.

The traffic stop analysis (warning vs. citation) is believed to be the first study of its kind to compare outcomes for individual single offense types — controlling for behavior to isolate the role of officer discretion. Full methodological detail is available in the Technical Appendix.

Data on DC arrests and citations is drawn from two periods: 1/1/2023–8/31/2024 and 1/1/2025–2/18/2026. The 2023–2024 data is more complete due to additional restorative justice records that allowed error correction, particularly for juvenile citations.

Body-Worn Cameras: A Matter of Will and Priorities

A Statement from Interim Independent Police Monitor Aeiramique Glass

I want to be direct with the Madison community, with the Common Council, and with the Mayor: I will not produce another report on body-worn cameras. Madison has had the reports. The feasibility study. The committee recommendations. The pilot. The conversations. Year after year, report after report — and still, no cameras.

Madison is the capital city of Wisconsin — the second largest city in the state. You are a city that has led on issues of inclusion, that invests in public services, that says it values community trust and equitable policing. You are a city that can do this. And yet the Madison Police Department remains among the very few law enforcement agencies of your size in this country that still do not have body-worn cameras.I have been doing police accountability work for over a decade. I have fought alongside communities and against police unions to make sure body-worn cameras were not just implemented — but implemented correctly, with policy, with equity safeguards, with community input. I helped get cameras in place in cities where the resistance was real and the stakes were high. When I arrived in Madison, I felt like I had stepped back in time.We are at a moment where nearly every major city in the country has BWC. Independent civilian oversight offices are operating in cities across the United States — and so are body-worn cameras.

The agencies that still lack comprehensive BWC programs are primarily small rural departments, local sheriff's offices with limited budgets, and some specialized federal units. Madison does not belong in that category. Even smaller surrounding cities in Wisconsin have body-worn cameras. Madison has not caught up — and the gap is no longer explainable.And the moment we are in makes this more urgent, not less. The current federal administration is actively removing body-worn camera requirements and rolling back transparency mandates for federal law enforcement. At the exact moment the federal government is moving backward, cities must move forward. Madison must not just meet this moment — it must catch up to it. The Madison Police Department remains among the 19% of law enforcement agencies in this country that still do not have body-worn cameras. Not because the technology doesn't exist. Not because the research isn't clear. Not because the path forward is unknown. At this point, this is no longer a question of information. It is a question of will. It is a question of priorities. And it is a question this City needs to answer.

I have been doing this work for over fifteen years — in communities, in policy rooms, in the streets, and in the institutions. I understand what it means when accountability depends on chance. When the only reason we have footage from a case reviewed in this very report is that one of two officers happened to be wearing a camera during a pilot program. One officer. One camera. And without it, that case — an unlawful arrest, charges that never should have been filed, a person who

should never have been arrested in the first place — comes down to one person's word against another's. That is not an accountability system. That is luck.

Think about the people in this community who file complaints. Who come forward — sometimes at great personal cost — to say something was wrong. They deserve a system where the evidence exists. Every officer who acts with professionalism and integrity deserves a record that shows it. And every investigation that is reduced to conflicting accounts, with no way to know what actually happened, represents a failure — not of memory, but of infrastructure.

I want to address something directly.

At the end of last year, a suggestion was made that the Office of the Independent Police Monitor should be replaced by body-worn cameras — that the City could fund one or the other, but not both. I want to acknowledge and thank the alders who stood up for independent civilian oversight. And I want to be equally clear that the alders who raised the need for body-worn cameras were right to do so. Both positions came from a real place. Both reflect a genuine desire for accountability.

But the framing was wrong. And I will not let it stand unchallenged.

This is not one or the other. It is both. It has always been both.

Body-worn cameras and independent civilian oversight serve fundamentally different purposes. A camera records. Oversight ensures the record means something — that footage is preserved, accessed, reviewed independently, and acted upon. Body-worn cameras without independent oversight are an expensive recording device with no accountability guarantee. And independent oversight without body-worn cameras means this Office is trying to get to the truth with one hand tied behind its back.

I also want to name something that gets lost in these conversations: body-worn cameras without the right policy can cause harm. We have seen it across the country. Footage used for facial recognition surveillance. Officers reviewing footage before writing reports, shaping their narrative around what the camera saw. Cameras muted at the exact moments that matter most. Footage withheld from the public and from oversight bodies. A camera is a tool. The policy determines whether that tool serves accountability or undermines it.

That is why this Office is not simply asking for cameras. We are asking for cameras done right — with a comprehensive public policy developed with community input, with independent OIPM access to footage, with equity safeguards, with transparency reporting, and with real consequences for non-compliance.

This community has been waiting long enough. The data is in. The pilot is done. The path forward is clear.

What is needed now is not another study. Not another pilot. Not another conversation about whether. What is needed is a decision — a real one, backed by a budget, a timeline, and the political will to see it through. Madison has the resources. Madison has the expertise. Madison has everything it needs except the decision. I am asking this City to make it.

Where Madison Stands

The Madison Police Department conducted a body-worn camera pilot program, the findings of which were documented in the OIPM's October 2025 Pilot Report. The pilot covered a limited cohort of officers and was governed by a pilot-specific SOP rather than a permanent, comprehensive policy. The pilot has concluded. MPD does not currently have body-worn cameras deployed department-wide and needs them now.

Key Finding from the OIPM Pilot Report (October 2025)

The pilot demonstrated that body-worn cameras can function operationally within MPD. It also demonstrated that the policy framework required to make cameras a genuine accountability tool — rather than simply a recording device — was not in place. Cameras were deployed before the policies, training, oversight access, and community safeguards necessary to support them were established. The technology ran ahead of the accountability infrastructure. Because the pilot was not structured to capture the data mandated by the Council, full BWC implementation could instead be phased in using a randomized controlled design to ensure the required data are collected.

Eight of ten preconditions remain unmet.

Two are partially met.

Zero are fully met.

Full deployment without addressing these conditions would produce a system that records without accountability — and that is not what this community was promised.

A Final Word

A case reviewed in this report — including a case involving BWC muting during a critical arrest encounter, reviewed because one of two officers happened to be wearing a camera — illustrates exactly what is lost when accountability depends on chance.

Every community member who files a complaint deserves a system where the evidence exists. Every officer who acts with professionalism deserves a record that shows it. Every investigation that comes down to “one person’s word against another’s” represents a failure of infrastructure, not just a failure of memory.

Madison has the resources, the expertise, and the institutional knowledge to do this right. What is required now is a decision. This Office is asking the City to make it.

Policy, Practices & Systems Assessment

This section examines structural elements of the accountability ecosystem — the systems, relationships, and policy gaps that shape how oversight functions in Madison. Some of these are not complaint-specific. They are architectural. They determine whether independent oversight is possible in practice, not just in ordinance.

The Accountability Ecosystem

The full accountability ecosystem — the OIPM, PCOB, PSIA, PFC, City Attorney, and DA — is described in detail in the Complaint Process section of this report. This section focuses on the structural gaps and policy concerns within that ecosystem that require action.

The City Attorney Structural Conflict

The City Attorney's Office provides legal counsel to City agencies — including MPD. This creates a structural conflict for the OIPM. When this Office requires legal counsel — for complaint proceedings, for institutional questions, for engagement with the Police and Fire Commission — it currently has no independent access to legal representation that is not also representing the entity it oversees.

This is not a theoretical concern. It has direct operational consequences. The OIPM's Legal Services line carries a $50,000 annual appropriation. Historically, $0 of that appropriation has been spent — because the Office has had no mechanism to access independent counsel. In this reporting period, that line is in active use for the first time.

The MPD–District Attorney Relationship

When MPD makes an arrest, the case is referred to the Dane County District Attorney's Office for a charging decision. The Court Intake Unit reviews arrests the following morning. If a person has bailed out, it may be weeks or months before a charging decision is made. In cases involving deferred prosecution, MPD's Court Intake Unit may never receive notification.

MPD can communicate concerns to the DA after a referral, but there is no standard protocol governing that communication. There are currently no Memoranda of Understanding between the DA's Office and MPD on charging decisions, communication timelines, or notification requirements.

This gap has direct consequences for complaint review. When the OIPM examines a case in which charges were filed, modified, or dropped, the absence of a documented communication record makes it difficult to establish the sequence of decisions — and who made them. Case 1 in this report illustrates this directly.

> **OIPM Recommendation: MPD and DA's Office develop and execute a formal MOU governing post-arrest communication, charging notification timelines, and deferred prosecution reporting. This is a matter of institutional accountability — and of fairness to complainants.**

The Chilling Effect — Fear of Filing a Complaint

One of the most significant and least visible barriers to accountability is the fear that filing a complaint will make things worse. This is not an unfounded fear. For individuals who are facing active charges, whose cases are pending before the DA, or who have outstanding warrants, filing a complaint against an officer who was involved in their arrest creates a genuine and rational risk. They may worry that the complaint will be used against them in their criminal proceeding, that the officer will retaliate, or that the DA's office — which works closely with the same department — will view the complaint as adversarial and respond accordingly.

This chilling effect is compounded in cases involving what appear to be pretext arrests — where the stated basis for an arrest may not reflect the actual reason for the stop or detention. When the OIPM reviews a case and determines that an arrest was unlawful or that the basis for charges is not supported, there must be a formal process or mandate of MPD to communicate that determination to the DA's office, and if the DA chooses to proceed, it is on record MPD took the moral steps. Currently, no such protocol exists. PSIA and OIPM can issue findings. But there is no established mechanism for MPD to formally communicate to the DA: "we no longer agree with the basis for this arrest; these charges should be reconsidered." That gap has direct consequences for the people most harmed by the conduct of MPD.

> **OIPM Recommendation: The MOU between MPD and the DA's office described in the prior section should include a provision establishing a formal notification protocol whereby the OIPM can communicate its findings regarding the lawfulness of an arrest directly to the DA's office — with a required response timeline. This is not a request for prosecutorial authority. It is a request for a channel that allows independent oversight findings to reach the decision-makers who can act on them.**

Incarcerated Individuals and Public Defenders — A Gap in the Complaint System

People who are incarcerated face unique and compounding barriers to filing complaints with the OIPM. They may not have reliable access to the internet, phone, or mail. They may not know this Office exists or that they have the right to file. They may fear that filing will affect their conditions of confinement, their parole or probation status, or their standing before the courts — or they may have filed but we don't have access to further communication with them. And in many cases, the conduct they experienced — the arrest, the use of force, the circumstances of their detention — occurred before they were incarcerated, making the filing timeline delayed and putting them at a disadvantage.

Public defenders represent a critical and underutilized resource in this ecosystem. They see patterns of officer conduct — the same officers appearing repeatedly in their clients' cases, the same tactics, the same charging patterns — that never make it into the formal complaint system. Public defenders are not currently a structured part of the OIPM's intake or referral process. They should be. A formal referral and communication channel between the Public Defender's office and the OIPM would surface patterns that

no individual complainant can see — and would extend the reach of independent oversight to people who are least able to access it on their own.

> **OIPM Recommendation: The OIPM will pursue a formal referral relationship with the Public Defender's office and will work with the City to establish accessible complaint pathways for incarcerated individuals — including written intake through correctional facilities and notification of OIPM services at the point of arrest.**

Technology & Surveillance Oversight

The OIPM has identified the absence of a formal community notification and review process for surveillance technology acquisition by MPD as an emerging policy concern. As MPD considers expansions in technology — including automated license plate readers, facial recognition tools, drone deployment, and other surveillance systems — the community has a right to know what is being acquired and what oversight governs its use.

Officer Commendations

Accountability is not only about what falls short. This Office is committed to recognizing professional conduct when it rises to the standard the community deserves. The OIPM will be adding an officer commendations section to the OIPM website, where conduct that reflects the best of what policing can be will be publicly recognized alongside the complaint record.

This is not a balance sheet — finding something to praise for every complaint. It is a genuine commitment to a complete picture. Officers who perform their duties with professionalism, compassion, and integrity deserve to have that documented publicly, just as officers whose conduct falls short are held accountable publicly.

Budget Overview, Resource Needs & New Budget Conversations

Independent civilian police oversight is only as strong as the resources behind it. An office with the legal authority to investigate misconduct, audit operations, appoint counsel for harmed community members, and issue formal recommendations — but without the staff, tools, or funding to act on any of it — is not an oversight office. It is a symbol of one.

This section presents the complete budget story of the OIPM: what the office had and why it could not use it; what it has now; what was lost and what those losses cost the community; what must change going forward; and how Madison's investment in oversight compares to national standards. It closes by introducing a new conversation the City must begin — about restitution, mediation, and restorative justice as budget items, not afterthoughts.

National Best Practice: What Oversight Funding Should Look Like

The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) and national research on police oversight identify a consistent principle: an oversight office's budget should be calculated as a defined percentage of the police department's budget — not as a standalone line item subject to annual negotiation. The scale of what an oversight office must monitor is proportional to the size and activity of the department being overseen.

The Madison Police Department's operating budget is approximately $98.5 million. The OIPM currently receives $405,964 — less than one-half of one percent of MPD's budget. National best practice calls for 2%–5%. At the 2% standard, the OIPM should receive approximately $1.97 million per year — nearly five times its current budget. This gap is not a rounding error. It is a structural decision about whether oversight is real or symbolic.

Standard	MPD Budget (FY2025)	What OIPM Budget Would Be	OIPM Actual (FY2025)	Annual Gap
NACOLE Lower Bound (2% of MPD)	~$98,500,000	~$1,970,000	$405,964	~$1,564,036
NACOLE Upper Bound (5% of MPD)	~$98,500,000	~$4,925,000	$405,964	~$4,519,036
OIPM as % of MPD (actual)	~$98,500,000	—	$405,964	0.41% of MPD budget

RECOMMENDATION: The Common Council should adopt a formal resolution establishing the OIPM's annual budget as a defined percentage of MPD's operating budget, consistent with NACOLE's national best practice range of 2%–5%. As an interim step for the FY2027 budget cycle, the OIPM requests a minimum floor of 1% of MPD's budget, with a committed path to 2% by FY2029.

Part 1 — What the Office Had — and Why It Could Not Use It

The OIPM was created in September 2020. For its first two fiscal years, it was operationally inactive — no staff, almost no spending. From 2022 through 2024, it slowly came online, but with critical vacancies: the Data Analyst position was unfilled throughout all of 2023, and a Program Assistant was not hired until late August 2023. The result was an office funded on paper at $450,000–$509,000 annually, spending less than half its budget every year — not because there was nothing to do, but because there was no one to do it.

Fiscal Year	Adopted Budget	Actual Spending	% Used	Why Spending Was Low
FY2020	$200,000	$2,100	1%	Created 9/1/20. No staff hired before year end.
FY2021	$450,769	$39,942	9%	Office non-operational. No Monitor in place.
FY2022	$468,373	$52,550	11%	Monitor hired late 2022. Data Analyst still vacant.
FY2023	$473,168	$203,701	43%	First meaningful operations. Data Analyst vacant all year. Program Asst. vacant until Aug, part-time Program Assistant hired.
FY2024	$509,420	$235,992	46%	First full operating year. Staff still below full capacity.
FY2025	$405,964	$349,684	86%	Turning point — fully active office. First year above 50%.
FY2026 (YTD)	$405,299	$35,853	9%	Early in year. Sivil case mgmt system procurement in progress.
TOTAL 2020 - 2025	$2,507,694	$883,969	35%	~$1.62M in adopted budget went unspent over 6 years.

From 2020 through 2025, approximately $1.62 million in the adopted OIPM budget went unspent. This was not surplus — it was evidence of an office too understaffed and

under-resourced to use what it was given. Community members had fewer protections. Cases went unprocessed. Counsel was never appointed. The legal services fund sat untouched for six consecutive years.

> **Madison operates on a use-it-or-lose-it budget structure. Every dollar the OIPM could not spend reverted to the City's general fund. That money did not carry forward. It is gone. And the community members who needed those services went without.**

Part 2 — Who Does This Work — The True Cost of OIPM Staffing

The OIPM currently operates with three staff members. It is important that the Common Council and Mayor understand precisely what each person is doing — because the official position titles do not capture the reality of what this office requires of its team.

Interim Independent Police Monitor

Serves as the chief executive, agency head, and public face of the OIPM — operating with statutory independence under M.G.O. §5.19. The IPM investigates, audits, monitors, reviews, oversees, and manages every case that comes through this Office without a case management system. Directs staff and consultants. Sets direction. Generates recommendations. Manages all community, government, and institutional relationships. Serves as Executive Secretary/Advisor to the Police Civilian Oversight Board. A public official — visible, accountable, and present in every district of this city. The IPM can also appoint legal counsel to support a complainant before the Police and Fire Commission. Assumed office December 8, 2025. In Oct. 2026 Interim IPM will manage the recruitment process for the permanent Independent Police Monitor.

Office Manager / Program Assistant 2 — One Position, Three Jobs

The Program Assistant 2 is classified and compensated as a single administrative position. In practice, this staff member is performing the full scope of three distinct functional roles simultaneously:

Office Operations & Administration: Managing all purchasing, payroll, public records requests, scheduling, and vendor relationships. Board Support & Community Liaison for the PCOB: Staffing all PCOB meetings and subcommittees, managing Board member recruitment and onboarding, coordinating monthly stipend payments and childcare reimbursements, liaising between the OIPM and community partners. Executive Administrative Support to the IPM: Direct admin support to the IPM–calendaring, correspondence, document management, communications, and media development.

This is not a description of what this position theoretically could do. It is a description of what this person is doing right now, every week. The FY2027 budget request must reflect this reality — either through reclassification or by adding a dedicated Board Liaison FTE.

Data Analyst 2 — Part-Time Position, Full-Time Workload

The OIPM's Data Analyst 2 position is currently filled on a part-time basis. The City's own position description (Job No. 2023-00482, salary range $73,199–$86,863 annually for full-time) makes clear the scope of this role: developing data acquisition plans; extracting and analyzing records from MPD's records management systems; conducting statistical analysis of patterns in policing activity; building reports and data visualizations for the PCOB and public; and serving as technical liaison to MPD and other government offices.

The racial disparity analyses, traffic stop analysis, disorderly conduct audit, officer complaint pattern analysis, and BWC audit findings documented throughout this report were all produced by this analyst — on a part-time schedule, without a case management system, relying on manual data requests. This position must be converted to full-time.

Part 3 — What Was Never Used — The Legal Services Crisis

Every year since 2020, the OIPM's adopted budget has included $50,000 for Legal Services. This line item exists to fulfill one of the most powerful and nationally distinctive provisions of M.G.O. §5.19: the Monitor's authority to appoint legal counsel for community members harmed by police misconduct, at a cost of up to $15,000 per complaint. In six years of operation, this budget has been spent at exactly $0 — not because it was unneeded, but because the office lacked the staff to process cases to the point where counsel appointments were warranted.

Year	Legal Services Budgeted	Actual Spent	Cumulative Unspent	Status
FY2020	$50,000	$0	$50,000	Office not operational
FY2021	$50,000	$0	$100,000	No Monitor in place
FY2022	$50,000	$0	$150,000	Monitor hired late year; insufficient capacity
FY2023	$50,000	$0	$200,000	Backlog developing; staffing below threshold
FY2024	$50,000	$0	$250,000	First full year; backlog not yet cleared
FY2025	$50,000	$0	$300,000	Fully active; capacity still being built
TOTAL	$300,000	$0	$300,000	Six consecutive years. Zero community members served through this fund.

FY2026: The Legal Services Budget Is Now Being Used for Four Things It Was Not Designed For

In fiscal year 2026, for the first time, money is being drawn from the Legal Services budget — but not primarily to appoint counsel for community members. The $50,000 is currently carrying four distinct needs simultaneously:

What	Detail	Source of Funds
Independent Counsel for the OIPM institution	$20,000 — arriving April 2026 on contract/consulting basis. The OIPM requires its own legal representation, fully separate from the City Attorney who advises MPD. This is a structural necessity, not an optional expense.	Legal Services (FY2026) — no other budget authority exists
Expert Opinion Costs	Variable — independent expert analysis required in specific cases and audits.	Legal Services (FY2026) — no other budget authority exists
Case Management System (Sivil)	Year 1 cost: $14,673.91 (Standard tier). See Part 4 for full detail.	Legal Services (FY2026) — no other budget authority exists
Community Member Legal Representation	The original purpose of this fund — appointing counsel for harmed community members before the PFC, up to $15,000 per complaint. Now crowded out by the three institutional needs above.	Intended purpose — now competing for space

> **The $50,000 Legal Services budget is being asked to fund four distinct needs simultaneously. This is not a budget problem. It is a structural failure that the City must correct in FY2027 by creating four separate, protected budget lines.**

Part 4 — Case Management Infrastructure — The Sivil System

The OIPM is procuring Sivil Technologies — a case management platform specifically designed for independent civilian police oversight offices, obtained through Carahsoft Technology Corp., the government's largest technology solutions provider. Sivil is not a generic complaint management tool adapted for this purpose. It was built for this purpose: Independent civilian police oversight, complaint intake and case tracking, pattern analysis across officers and districts, public-facing transparency reporting, data sharing and secure handling of records and investigative information.

Two Options — Standard Tier vs. Integration with MPD

Two quotes were obtained. The difference is whether MPD integrates into the system, enabling deeper real-time data sharing. The OIPM has a fully operational system either way. The integration question is a policy decision for City leadership — and if integration proceeds, the additional cost should be borne by MPD, not the OIPM.

	Standard Tier (OIPM Only)	With MPD Integration (Elite)	MPD's Share (the Difference)
Year 1	$14,673.91	$29,347.82	$14,673.91
Year 2	$16,141.30	$32,282.60	$16,141.30
Year 3	$17,755.44	$35,510.87	$17,755.43
Year 4	$19,531.52	$39,063.04	$19,531.52
Year 5	$21,483.70	$42,967.39	$21,483.69
5-Year Total	$89,585.87	$179,171.72	$89,585.85

The OIPM's cost is $14,673.91 in Year 1 regardless of which option is chosen. If MPD chooses integration, the total cost is $29,347.82 in Year 1 — with MPD paying the difference of $14,673.91. If MPD declines integration, the OIPM proceeds with the Standard tier at $14,673.91 and operates a complete, fully functional system.

> **RECOMMENDATION: Create a dedicated Technology & Infrastructure budget line beginning in FY2027. The Sivil subscription must not compete with the community legal protection fund. If MPD integration at the Elite tier is pursued, MPD should fund the premium — approximately $17,917 per year. This should not come from the OIPM's budget.**

Part 5 — A New Conversation — Community Harm, Mediation & Restorative Justice

The OIPM closes this budget section by naming a conversation that does not yet exist in the City's budget structure — and that must begin now. Police accountability, as it is currently designed, focuses almost entirely on what happens to officers: whether they are disciplined, retrained, or separated from service. What happens to the people they harmed is largely left unaddressed.

Officer discipline does not repair a broken wrist. A reprimand does not compensate a family for medical bills. A sustained finding does not give someone back the hours they spent in a cell for a charge that should never have been filed. And in some cases, the

right answer is not that an officer should lose their job — it is that a civil harm occurred, and the person harmed deserves to be made whole.

Need	What It Is	Proposed Budget Line
Mediation Services	Voluntary, structured mediation between complainants and officers — an alternative or supplement to formal discipline. In some cases, what a complainant needs is to be heard.	Restorative Justice & Mediation Fund — NEW
Restorative Justice Programming	Facilitated restorative processes for cases where formal discipline is not the right resolution. RJ is not a lesser outcome — it is a different kind of accountability.	Restorative Justice & Mediation Fund — NEW
Civil Legal Assistance for Complainants	Legal representation or referral for complainants who may have civil claims arising from police conduct — separate from PFC disciplinary proceedings.	Community Legal Protection Fund — EXPANDED
Community Restitution Framework	A formal process for the City to provide direct restitution to individuals harmed in cases with sustained findings — medical costs, lost wages, property damage.	Community Restitution Fund — NEW (City-level)

The OIPM is not proposing specific dollar amounts for these programs in this report. The design of these frameworks requires a dedicated policy conversation with the Common Council, the Mayor's office, community stakeholders, and legal counsel. What the OIPM is doing here is naming these needs formally for the first time and committing to bring a full proposal forward in the FY2027 budget cycle.

> **RECOMMENDATION: Consider a One-Time Budget Recovery Allocation. From 2020 through 2025, the OIPM was allotted over $2.5 million in budget authority and spent approximately $884,000 — leaving roughly $1.62 million unspent, not because needs did not exist, but because the office could not be built fast enough. Those unmet needs are now active. The OIPM respectfully requests that the Mayor and Common Council consider a one-time supplemental allocation to address the gap between what was budgeted and what was possible during the years of under-operation.**

Strategic Priorities 2025–2026

This section describes what the Office of the Independent Police Monitor is building toward in the year ahead. These are not aspirational statements. They are specific, actionable, and grounded in the work already underway. Each priority has a clear owner, a clear goal, and a clear measure of success.

Priority 1 — Operational Infrastructure

Goal: Build the systems that make sustained, effective oversight possible

The foundational work of this year was building infrastructure that did not exist. Intake systems, case classification, case management, SOPs, the PCOB handbook, board onboarding processes — these are not glamorous, but they are what make the rest of the work possible. In the year ahead, this Office will continue building and formalizing this infrastructure.

Initiative	Status	Target
Case management system implementation	In procurement — must go through City technology review process	Approved through City tech review process and in use by May 2026
Independent institutional counsel	Arriving April 2026 on contract/consulting basis; continued funding needed	Dedicated budget line in FY2027 to sustain beyond initial contract
New OIPM – MPD MOU for real-time data access	OIPM has access to all MPD records but must not be treated as a public requester — GovQA and standard City agency channels are not appropriate for an independent oversight office requiring real-time data to function	Formal MOU executed establishing real-time data sharing protocols by Q2 2026
OIPM website — case summary publication	First summaries being published; website publication process in place	All closed cases published on OIPM website within 30 days of closure

Initiative	Status	Target
Officer commendations — website launch	In development	Live by Q3 2026
SOPs — full Office operations manual	In progress	Complete by Q2 2026

Priority 2 — Community Presence & Trust

Goal: Be visible, accessible, and trusted by the people this Office serves

An oversight office that the community does not know about cannot do its job. In the year ahead, this Office will deepen its community presence through expanded programming, district-level dialogue, and direct engagement with communities most affected by the policing patterns documented in this report.

Program	Description	Timeline
Know Your Rights series	Community education on rights during police encounters — in partnership with community organizations	Q2 2026
District listening sessions	Neighborhood-level listening sessions in all 6 districts, using district community rooms as venues	Q2–Q3 2026
Youth advisory initiative	Structured engagement with young people on their experiences with policing in Madison	Q3 2026
Alder briefing series	Direct briefings with Common Council members on OIPM findings and recommendations	Begins March 16, 2026
Learning sessions — PCOB	Structured educational sessions for board members & community on accountability frameworks and data literacy	Ongoing
Cadet community tour	connecting new MPD cadets with community organizations, ending with Restorative facilitated conversation	In development with Training Center

Priority 3 — Racial Equity in Policing

Goal: Name the disparities, track the response, and hold the line

The data in this report does not allow for ambiguity. There are racial disparities in Disorderly Conduct enforcement, in traffic stop outcomes, and in juvenile arrest patterns. The OIPM's job is not to solve these disparities alone — it is to document them clearly, issue specific recommendations, track whether they are being addressed, and report back to the community.

What this Office will track in 2025–2026

- DC citation rates for Black and white juveniles — monitored each reporting cycle.
- Traffic stop warning vs. citation outcomes — monitored by race and offense type.
- MPD response to formal OIPM recommendations — documented and published.
- City Council action on BWC resolution and deployment timeline.
- Progress on MPD–DA MOU development.
- Surveillance technology acquisition activity.
- Treatment of unsheltered community members — how people experiencing homelessness are policed and what protections exist.
- Treatment of vulnerable populations with mental health circumstances — ensuring this community is not overlooked in complaint review, data analysis, or policy recommendations.

Priority 4 — Complaint Timeliness & Case Quality

Goal: Every complaint resolved, documented, and published — on time

This Office is managing a significant ongoing caseload. There are currently 17 open cases — while new cases continue to come in every month. All case work is being done manually, without a case management system, by an understaffed and under-resourced office that operates independently from every other City agency. In some cases this Office also provides a form of aftercare — following up with complainants, monitoring for retaliation, and ensuring people understand what happened and what comes next. Going forward, every complaint filed with the OIPM will be acknowledged within five business days, classified within ten, assigned a pathway within fifteen, and resolved on a timeline that is communicated clearly to the complainant from the start. Case summaries will be published on the OIPM website within 30 days of closure.

These are standards this Office is setting for itself. They are not aspirational — they are operational commitments. The infrastructure being built this year exists to make them possible.

Priority 5 — Legislative & Budget Advocacy

Goal: Secure the resources and structural authority this Office requires

Effective oversight requires adequate funding, independent legal capacity, and structural protections that cannot be withdrawn when the findings are inconvenient. The City grants and approves the overall agency budget — but the Independent Police Monitor controls how those funds are spent within the Office. That independence is not a courtesy. It is a structural requirement of this Office's mandate. The OIPM will pursue the following in the FY2027 budget cycle and through direct legislative engagement:

Request	Purpose	Priority
Budget increase for case management infrastructure	Fund the systems and staff necessary to manage caseload at full capacity	FY2027
Independent institutional counsel — dedicated line	Legal representation for the Office that is independent of the City Attorney	FY2027
Expanded community engagement budget	Fund mediation, restorative justice programming, and civil legal assistance for complainants	FY2027
New OIPM – MPD MOU (real-time data access)	Establish formal real-time data sharing between OIPM and MPD — OIPM must not be treated as a public requester or standard City agency; independent mandate requires direct, timely access to records	FY2027
Racial equity audit — traffic stops	Commission a comprehensive, independent audit of MPD traffic stop outcomes	FY2027

> Equality is the goal. Equity is the process.
>
> This Office is asking for what it needs to do the work — not more, not less.

AN OPEN LETTER
To the Community and Decision-Makers of Madison
From Aeiramique Glass, Interim Independent Police Monitor | March 2026

OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR

City of Madison, Wisconsin

> **An Open Letter**
>
> **To the Community and Decision-Makers of Madison**
>
> From Aeiramique Glass, Interim Independent Police Monitor | March 2026

I am writing to both of you at once — to the community this Office serves and to the officials this community elected. I am doing that deliberately. You need to hear the same thing, at the same time, so there is no confusion about what this Office found, what it is asking for, and what each of you has the power to do about it.

Let me start with what I know to be true. The people of Madison deserve a police department that serves them fairly and an oversight structure strong enough to hold it accountable when it falls short. You have both. You have a chief who shows up — in the community, in the streets, in the conversations that matter. You have an ordinance that gives this Office real authority. You have a community that is paying attention. What you do not yet have is the full commitment to match what you have.

That is what this letter is about.

What I Found

I came into this role on December 8, 2025. I did not ease in. I met with Chief Patterson and all three Assistant Chiefs on day one. I visited every district and the Training Center. I met with members of the community and listened. I reviewed cases waiting for resolution and worked through a backlog that had built up over years. I looked at five years of traffic stop data. I looked at Disorderly Conduct arrest trends going back years. I looked at what this Office had been given and what it had been able to do with it.

Here is what the data shows — plainly, without hedging:

> Black juveniles in Madison are roughly 25 times more likely than white juveniles to receive a sole Disorderly Conduct citation — a disparity that reflects racialized over-enforcement at the discretionary level, and is statistically significant. This distinction matters: juveniles cited solely for Disorderly Conduct are eligible for restorative justice programs, while those facing a state charge of Disorderly Conduct are not. Restorative justice and diversion are the right pathways when young people make mistakes — but only if they reach those pathways. A sole Disorderly Conduct citation opens that door. A state charge of Disorderly Conduct does not. The same behavior. A conversation for a white youth. A criminal charge for a Black youth.
>
> White drivers stopped for the same offense as Black drivers are 45% more likely to receive a warning instead of a citation. That gap holds across five years and 39 offense types. Madison's DC arrest rate is approximately 11 times the national average. It is approximately 50 times Milwaukee's. These are not allegations. They are findings. They are in this report with the data behind them.

I also found something else. I found officers doing hard work in difficult circumstances. I found district captains who want resources and support. I found a Chief who is genuinely in relationship with this community. In my observations and in conversations with residents across this city, Chief Patterson is respected. He is trusted. That is not a small thing, and I do not take it for granted.

I found a board — the PCOB — full of people who care deeply about this community and are ready to do the work.

Madison has real strengths. I am not going to pretend otherwise. But strengths are not enough when the data shows what this data shows.

To the Mayor, the Common Council, and City Leadership

You have something significant here. Madison General Ordinance §5.19 created one of the most powerful independent oversight mandates in the country — and the only one of its kind in this state. The rest of Wisconsin has internal affairs and a Police and Fire Commission. Madison has an independent oversight office with investigative authority, audit capacity, and community governance. That matters.

But you have not funded it at the level it requires. You have not resolved the structural conflicts that limit its independence. And you have not made the decisions that the data in this report is asking you to make.

I am going to be specific about what I need from you — because this is not the place for vague recommendations:

What We Are Asking For	Why It Cannot Wait
A resolution committing to full BWC deployment — with a comprehensive policy developed with community input before a single camera is activated. The cost of BWC belongs in MPD's budget — not the OIPM's.	The pilot ended without a decision. The community has a right to a record of what happens when an officer stops them, arrests them, or uses force against them. That record does not exist for most MPD interactions today. This is a decision that has been deferred long enough.
Reform of Disorderly Conduct enforcement — starting with equal access to restorative justice for Black juveniles	A 6.9 to 1 citation disparity is not a policing anomaly. It is a policy outcome. Milwaukee changed this through deliberate reform. Madison can do the same.
A formal MPD–DA MOU on post-arrest communication and charging decisions	Without it, this Office cannot fully evaluate what happened in cases where charges were filed, changed, or dropped. Accountability has a gap where that protocol should be.
Independent institutional counsel for the OIPM — arriving April 2026	The City Attorney represents MPD. That is a structural conflict. Independent counsel is not a luxury — it is what independence requires. It must be funded to continue.
A FY2027 budget that funds this Office at the level its mandate requires	OIPM currently operates at 0.44% of the MPD budget. NACOLE minimum standard is 2%. Three staff are carrying five functions. This is a math problem with a straightforward solution.

I am aware that budgets are constrained. I am aware that there are competing priorities. I am also aware that this City made a decision to create an oversight structure — and that decision comes with an obligation to resource it. You cannot have the credibility of saying Madison has independent oversight without giving that office what it needs to function.

The Body-Worn Camera Decision Is the Test

I want to say something directly about body-worn cameras — because this is the decision that tells the community whether Madison means what it says about accountability.

The pilot ended. The OIPM position is clear and has not changed: cameras without strong policy and independent oversight can cause harm. We have seen that in other cities. We do not want that here.

The absence of cameras also causes harm. Every day that Madison operates without department-wide BWC deployment, there is no complete record of what happens when an officer stops someone, arrests someone, or uses force. The community has a right to that record. Officers have an interest in that record too. The gap costs trust on both sides — and it costs it every single day.

This is not a choice between cameras and accountability. It has always been both.

I hear a lot about the Madison Way. I hear MPD talk about policing forward. I believe that is a genuine aspiration — and I am holding this City to it. Because if Madison is truly forward thinking, then justice and accountability are not obstacles to community relations. They are the pathway to it. You cannot police forward while deferring the decisions that determine whether a community trusts its police department. BWC is one of those decisions.What I am asking for is a resolution — not a study, not another pilot, not a working group. A resolution that commits this City to full deployment and requires that a comprehensive, community-informed policy be in place before a single camera is activated. That is a decision the Mayor and Common Council can make. It is a decision that has been deferred long enough.

The community is watching this one. So am I.

To the Community

You are the reason this Office exists. Not as a procedural requirement — as a genuine commitment to the idea that the people most affected by policing should have a real voice in how it is held accountable. That is what the OIPM is designed to be. That is what I am working to make it.

I need you to know a few things.

First: this Office is open. If you have had an experience with MPD that you believe should be on record — file a complaint. You do not need a lawyer. You do not need certainty that you were wronged. You need only to tell us what happened. We will take it from there.

Second: the data in this report describes your community. The Disorderly Conduct numbers, the traffic stop disparities, the patterns in who gets warned and who gets cited — this is not abstract. These are encounters that happen on your streets, to people you know, possibly to you. You have a right to see this data. You have a right to be angry about it. And you have the right to demand that your elected officials respond to it.

Third: the PCOB — your Police Civilian Oversight Board — is your governing body for this work. They meet. They engage. They are building something. If you want to be part of it, reach out. Their calendar is going public. Show up. Your presence is not decoration — it is evidence that this community is paying attention.

And finally: hold your officials accountable for what is in this report. Not eventually. Now. We are in budget season. The decisions being made in the next few months will determine whether this Office has what it needs to do its job for the next several years. Your voice in that process matters.

What I Believe

I believe Madison wants to get this right. I have seen enough in the months I have been here to believe that is true. The chief is willing. The board is engaged. The community is watching. The data is clear.

Equality is the goal. Equity is the process. This report is part of that process — the part where the findings are named, the gaps are documented, and the people with the authority to act are asked, directly, to use it.

The rest is up to you.

Aeiramique Glass

Interim Independent Police Monitor

Office of the Independent Police Monitor | City of Madison, Wisconsin

March 2026

Technical Appendices - Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops

Appendix 1: Testing for Racially Biased Enforcement

To test for racial bias in MPD officer actions, we compared the rate at which officers gave citations versus warnings to Black versus white drivers in traffic stops. We specifically used data from incidents entered as "Traffic Stops" (as opposed to other categories, such as traffic enforcement operations), since the former were entirely initiated by officers (and included stops in which officers exercised the highest levels of discretion - e.g., investigatory stops). For cases to be most comparable, we analyzed stops with only a single offense, for which a citation or warning was given. We also excluded stops for speeding, for which officers give tickets specifying a speed range over the speed limit (e.g. 1-10 mph over the limit), since officers frequently reduced the noted speed in such cases. Thus, the speeding citations wouldn't necessarily represent fully matching violations committed by all the drivers with a given ticket. Statistical analyses were performed on the statistical software platform R.

For the vast majority of the type of offenses we examined, the ratio of warnings to citations was greater for white than Black drivers. For many types of offenses (e.g., "OPERATE MOTOR VEHICLE W/O 2 HEADLIGHTS", "FAIL/OBEY TRAFFIC SIGN/SIGNAL", "FAIL/DISPLAY VEHICLE LICENSE PLATES", "OPERATION W/O REQUIRED LAMPS LIGHTED", " NON-REGISTRATION OF AUTO, ETC", " OPERATOR VIOLATE RED TRAFFIC LIGHT ", etc.) the difference between Black and white drivers was statistically significant (at the p=0.05 level) in a Fisher's Exact Test.

To more globally estimate the average magnitude of the white driver advantage, and its statistical significance, we performed an analysis with a generalized linear model using a logit link function, across 39 different types of offenses, with race coded as a 0-1 dummy variable. We found that the increased likelihood of a warning rather than a citation for white compared to Black drivers was highly statistically significant ($p = 8.78e\text{-}10$). The coefficient of the parameter for race had an estimated value of 0.37, meaning that the odds of a white driver being given a warning rather than a citation, after being stopped for a single non-speeding traffic offense, is 45% greater than for a Black driver stopped for the same single offense.

Officers giving a citation will sometimes reduce the citation, particularly for speeding offenses – in other words for a speeding offense, they will often reduce the stated speed on the ticket, dropping it to a lower category. Such a reduction is commonly noted in the narrative entered into the TraCS (Traffic and Criminal Software) system, with the narrative including the word "reduced".

Across all cases in the complete traffic dataset (which includes discretionary traffic stops, traffic enforcement initiatives, accidents, etc.) in which citations were given, "reduced" was present in the narrative in 35.25% of the entries for white drivers and 30.66% of the entries for Black drivers (a significant difference of $p= 1.929e\text{-}07$ in a one-sided Fisher's Exact Test). Across all cases described as a "Traffic Stop" in which citations were given for speeding (for a specified range of miles per hour over the speed

limit), "reduced" was present in the narrative in 42.30% of the entries for white drivers and 35.33% of the entries for Black drivers (p= 0.001443 in a one-sided Fisher's Exact Test). Across all cases described as "Traffic Complaint/Investigation" (traffic enforcement initiatives in response to citizen complaints) in which citations were given for speeding (for a specified range of miles per hour over the speed limit), "reduced" was present in the narrative in 35.66% of the entries for white drivers and 31.86% of the entries for Black drivers (p= 0.0006817 in a one-sided Fisher's Exact Test). Overall, the reductions led to a preponderance of citations in the lowest ("EXCEEDING SPEED ZONES, ETC. (1-10 MPH)") category. White drivers consistently had substantially better odds of being given a reduction in their citations for speeding, with the difference between races being highly statistically significant.

Appendix 2: Patterns of Racial Disparity

Racial disparities for Black versus white drivers stopped in incidents entered as a "Traffic Stop" vary throughout the day, rising dramatically at night. The pattern remains quite constant over summer and winter months. The overall ratio of Black to white drivers in "Traffic Stop" cases is 0.643. The overall ratio of Black to white drivers in "Traffic Complaint/Investigation" cases is 0.418.

The ratio of "Traffic Stops" involving only nonmoving violations (e.g. expired registration) compared to those that include moving violations is 0.986 for Black drivers and 0.483 for white drivers (p < 2.2e-16 in a one-sided Fisher's Exact Test). In other words, Black drivers were stopped almost as often for nonmoving violations as for moving violations, while white drivers were far less likely to be stopped for nonmoving violations. The ratio of "Traffic Stops" for nonmoving versus moving violations rises at night.



Accidents, and especially not-at-fault accidents, provide a commonly used benchmark for racial demographics of drivers on the road. This can be compared with the racial

demographics of traffic stops. Across the full day, the ratio of Black to white drivers recorded as being in accidents is 0.428. The ratio of Black to white drivers recorded as being in accidents and not-at-fault (with no citation or warning issued) is 0.188. The number of such not-at-fault drivers included in the dataset (3 Black drivers, 16 white drivers) is too low for this to be considered a highly reliable estimate, but it is much closer to the ratio that one would expect from census data (ratio of Black alone to non-Hispanic white population in the City of Madison is 0.101). Between the hours of 11 PM and 4 AM, the ratio of Black to white drivers recorded as being in accidents is 0.556. Black drivers are being stopped at far higher rates relative to white drivers than one would expect from accident data (as a benchmark for racial demographics of drivers on the road).

Appendix 3: Impact of Race versus Socioeconomic Status

To examine the impact of socioeconomics/class status on traffic stops, we used vehicle value as a proxy. We obtained estimates of vehicle value, in dollars, using VIN numbers and the vinaudit.com website. We had to obtain vehicle values by laborious manual entry (an automated process was unavailable), so used only cases from 3.5 months of data (one month from summer 2024 and the remainder from summer 2025).

We examined race and vehicle value as predictors using a generalized linear model with a logit link function, with race represented by a 0-1 dummy variable. First we tested the explanatory value of race and vehicle value for whether a driver received purely warnings versus some citations in a "Traffic Stop" case. Race was a statistically significant predictor ($p = 0.004$; estimated coefficient = 0.488, favoring warnings for white drivers) while vehicle value was not a significant predictor ($p = 0.674$). Next, we examined race and vehicle value as predictors for whether a driver was in a "Traffic Stop" with purely nonmoving violations versus moving violations. Race was a statistically significant predictor ($p = 2.00e-07$; estimated coefficient = -0.862, with white drivers less likely to be stopped for purely nonmoving violations) while vehicle value was also a significant predictor, but weaker ($p = 1.32e-06$; estimated coefficient = - 4.90e-05, with stops for nonmoving violations less likely for more valuable vehicles). Finally, we examined race and vehicle value as predictors for whether a case was a "Traffic Stop" or an accident. Race was a statistically significant predictor ($p = 0.0009$; estimated coefficient = -0.572, with white drivers less likely to be stopped relative to being in an accident) while vehicle value was not a significant predictor ($p = 0.318$).

The observed patterns thus track race and not vehicle value. Note that it is not unexpected that vehicle value would have some predictive value for nonmoving violation stops, since cheap cars tend to be old and have more equipment problems that would constitute nonmoving violations.